On May 21, 2024, the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) made history by articulating the legal obligations of countries to protect the marine environment from climate-change related impacts. Here are the key points of the landmark Advisory Opinion and its far-reaching implications, which are expected to raise the bar for climate action.

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We have known for a while now that our world faces a triple planetary crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution. In spite of it, call my views progressive if you like, but I believe the need to develop and implement a more robust system of international law, for tackling a multifaceted planetary crisis, is compelling and at a climacteric (pun-unintended) stage. Advisory Opinions by international courts or tribunals can contribute to the explication of such law and carry both legal weight and moral authority, despite not being legally binding. Such advisory opinions are being recognised by legal experts as a novel mechanism for climate change litigation, which has been on the rise.

Forging a Stronger Science-Policy Nexus

To translate science into policy action requires interpreting existing law progressively and in cognizance of the latest scientific evidence. The International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) did just that in its landmark Advisory Opinion (henceforth “Opinion”) on climate change and the law of the sea, issued on May 21, 2024. The Opinion, which was notably unanimous, gave legal force to the inextricable scientific link between climate change and the health of the oceans.The Opinion provides legal recognition to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) latest and most dependable science on the cause-effect relationship between the accumulation of anthropogenic greenhouse gasses (GHGs) in the atmosphere on the one hand, and its manifold harmful effects on the ocean, on the other. This includes damaging effects through “sea level rise, increased ocean heat content and marine heat waves, ocean deoxygenation, and ocean acidification.” 

More on the topic: Climate Change-Threatened Small Island States Hail ‘Historic’ Ocean Court Victory

It is commendable how an international court extensively and boldly lays on the line the most recent and authoritative science. ITLOS (henceforth “the Tribunal”) bases its opinion directly on an explicit acknowledgment of the robust evidence and high level of scientific consensus drawn from the IPCC’s 2023 Synthesis Report, according to which climate change effects “substantial damages and increasingly irreversible losses” in coastal and open ocean ecosystems.

The Opinion provides due weight to some of the crucial findings of the IPCC that deserve widespread attention and replication, such as:

1. Human influence was very likely the main driver of the global mean sea level increase of 0.20 meters between 1901 and 2018, with the latter likely to cause the “frequency of extreme sea level events at most locations to increase.” 
2. It is “virtually certain” (IPCC’s scientific parlance for the assessed likelihood of an outcome) that persistent warming of the global ocean has taken place since 1970; and it can be said with a “high level of confidence” (IPCC’s scientific parlance for the degree of scientific agreement) that the oceans have taken up more than 90% of the excess heat in the climate system. 
3. “The pH of ocean surface water decreased by 0.1 (high confidence), corresponding to a 26% increase in acidity.” Furthermore, marine ecosystems, especially coral reefs are at risk from ocean acidification, which “has impacts on the physiology, behavior and population dynamics of organisms” and which acts synergistically with global and local changes (such as eutrophication) leading to “…complex and amplified impacts for species and ecosystems.” 
4. The risks, projected adverse impacts, related losses and damages from climate change “escalate with every increment of global warming” (very high confidence).

Small-Island States Request to the Tribunal

Kudos to the Commission of Small-Island States (COSIS) for requesting the Tribunal for an Advisory Opinion on very specific legal questions. COSIS requested the Tribunal to clarify the obligations of State Parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (‘UNCLOS’), including under Part XII, to: 

(a) prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment in relation to the deleterious effects that result or are likely to result from climate change, including through ocean warming and sea level rise, and ocean acidification, which are caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere?

(b) to protect and preserve the marine environment in relation to climate change impacts, including ocean warming and sea level rise, and ocean acidification?

What follows are some significant findings of the Tribunal that have widespread and profound implications.

• Defining “pollution of the marine environment”

A key finding of the Tribunal was that the deleterious effects of anthropogenic GHG emissions fall within the purview of the “pollution of the marine environment,” as defined by UNCLOS. The Tribunal successfully assessed that anthropogenic GHG emissions fulfill the three cumulative criterion used by UNCLOS to define “pollution of the marine environment.” In this context, the Tribunal interprets that: 

(1) Greenhouse gasses are “substances” and the term “energy” includes “thermal energy or heat” within the meaning of Article 1.1 (4) of UNCLOS;

 (2) The greenhouse gas emissions in question are anthropogenic, a.k.a, produced by man, and released into a marine environment directly (as GHGs) or indirectly (as thermal energy);  

(3) The introduction of carbon dioxide (a type of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions) and heat (an example of thermal energy) into the marine environment causes climate change and ocean acidification, which “results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life,….etc,” as illustrated in Article 1.1 (4) of UNCLOS. 

• Obligation of due-diligence, high standards and upholding the principle of CBDR-RC

The framework nature of UNCLOS and its open character was recognised by both the Tribunal and several States-participants at the proceedings. Of central relevance here is UNCLOS Article 194, which is broad, all-encompassing and affirmative, calling on all States “to take all necessary measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from ‘any source.’” 

As per the Opinion, Article 194 of UNCLOS confers an obligation of due diligence and an obligation of conduct, clearly calling on all Parties to the Convention to take all measures necessary to prevent, reduce, and control marine pollution from anthropogenic GHG emissions. The Opinion also clearly expounds that such obligation is closely connected to the precautionary approach, which is to say that the absence of scientific certainty cannot come in the way of States taking all measures necessary to regulate marine pollution from anthropogenic GHG emissions. 

According to the Opinion, however, the standard of due diligence would vary depending on particular circumstances, which would include the scientific and technological information, the existence of relevant international rules and standards, the risk of harm, and the urgency involved.

Several participants to the proceedings expressed the view that the standard of due diligence for marine pollution from anthropogenic GHG emissions should be set considerably higher than any “best effort standard.” It is noteworthy that the final Opinion of the Tribunal also calls for the standard to be stringent. Simultaneously, it lends credence to the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR–RC) by recognising that the implementation of such due-diligence would differ on the basis of the capabilities of States and their available resources. Per the Tribunal, “such implementation requires a State with greater capabilities and sufficient resources to do more than a State not so well placed.” 

And yet, the principle of CBDR-RC “should not be used as a pretext to escape the responsibility that weighs on all States, both individually and collectively,..”.

• The Paris Agreement is not preemptive but informative 

In a world where international environmental law is fragmented and normative conflicts can arise, the Opinion’s exhortation of the need for consistency and mutual supportiveness between UNCLOS and other rules or sources of international law, including the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement, the Montreal Protocol (including the Kigali Amendment), and others, is credit-worthy.

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Even more credit-worthy is the Opinion’s pronouncement that the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement are not lex specialis’ in respect of the obligations of States Parties for climate-related action. In fact, in the words of ITLOS, States’ broad responsibilities under Article 194 of UNCLOS would not be satisfied simply by complying with the obligations and commitments under the Paris Agreement. In my view, kudos to ITLOS for recognizing the distinctiveness of each of the treaties – UNCLOS and the Paris Agreement exist separately from each other and have their own sets of obligations. 

The Opinion illustrates distinctly that UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement do not preempt climate-related action under UNCLOS, but are in fact relevant in interpreting and applying the Convention. Such an interpretation upholds the general rules of treaty interpretation under Article 31 (c) (3) of the Vienna Convention, which call for taking into account “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.” For instance, ITLOS opines that the temperature goal of 1.5C above pre-industrial levels and the timeline for emission pathways set out in the Paris Agreement inform the content of necessary measures under Article 194 (1) of the Convention. 

Conclusion 

This historic Opinion has several features with potentially far-reaching implications, not all of which can be covered with the ambit of this article. It is noteworthy that the Opinion was progressive in its interpretation of UNCLOS for States’ obligations concerning climate change and very straightforward in its application of the best available science. And as lucidly expressed by Tara Davenport of the National University of Singapore, an obligation of conduct (while not an obligation of result) is a serious and stringent standard and not one that States can hide behind. States can also use it as diplomatic leverage in any forum or as leverage nationally.

Eran Sthoeger, counsel to Timor Lester in the ITLOS proceeding, also strikingly propounds (in his private capacity), that whereas in international climate negotiations some States can carry more political weight and influence than others, advisory proceedings, on the other hard, present a unique opportunity for all countries to participate in an equal and fair way. In his words: “All States have a similar time slot and all have a similar voice and the same opportunity to influence the Tribunal or the Court. To an extent, the power dynamics and conversations behind the scenes also reflected equality.” 

This article is Part 1 of a 3-part series looking at landmark, climate-related Advisory Opinions issued by international courts. Stay tuned for Part 2 and Part 3.

The post The Recent ITLOS Advisory Opinion Is a Stringent Call for Due-Diligence for Climate Impacts on Oceans appeared first on Earth.Org.

This piece primarily unpacks the flagship 30×30 target and highlights the significance of the delivery of funding under Target 19. It also lays out some of the other pertinent provisions in the recently adopted treaty, heralded by the international community as the “Paris Agreement” for Nature. Read on to gauge its potential and what scientific experts say is requisite for effective implementation. 

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The global threat to biodiversity is so severe and all-encompassing (one million species already face extinction), it qualifies for “issue salience”. Can the 2022 Kunming-Montréal Global Biodiversity Framework be a watershed moment in international environmental law, finally delivering strong guidance to avert a global crisis of biodiversity? Can soft international law have the power to affect fundamental changes in the way biodiversity conservation currently takes place? Is this hinged upon how successful international diplomacy is in stimulating re-direction and scaling up of financial resources?

As always, the answer depends on the quality implementation, with standards of quality set collaboratively at the international level.

Background

Human-induced biodiversity loss and climate change, two mutually reinforcing global phenomena, have demonstrated the power to radically transform the Earth’s ecological and climate systems – at rates unprecedented in human history.

Multiple drivers of biodiversity loss – key amongst them being land and sea-use change, overexploitation, pollution and climate change (as shown by scientific experts) – act synergistically to reduce global ecosystem functioning, thereby affecting humans and our social and economic systems adversely. 

The enormity of the findings of the 2019 IPBES Report was not lost on the international community. In yet another wake-up call, the report finds that around one million species already face extinction and an average of 25%, from the assessed plants and animal groups, are threatened. The report’s findings resuscitated international policy action, after the failed 2010 Aichi targets. The need for an effective global strategic framework to guide action for long-term preservation of biodiversity and related ecosystem services has never been felt more strongly before. 

Historically, nations’ participation in global environmental treaties have had varying normative and behavioural impacts on domestic action, with varying degrees of incorporation in their national regulatory regimes. The hope is that the 2022 Kunming-Montréal Global Biodiversity Framework can animate the work needed, at all levels, to make fundamental changes in how conservation actions are carried out today.

COP15 negotiators reached a landmark agreement that includes a commitment to save 30% of land and water by 2030 as well as significant financing to protect biodiversity in the developing world.

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2022 Kunming-Montréal Global Biodiversity Framework 

The 2022 Kunming-Montréal Global Biodiversity Framework (herewith, the GBF), heralded as a landmark Agreement and the “Paris agreement” for nature, includes four broader Goals and 23 Targets towards the 2050 Vision of Living in Harmony with Nature of the Convention on Biological Diversity. 

The GBF has an ambitious short-term mission to “halt and reverse biodiversity loss” by 2030. A prerequisite for fulfilling this mission is a target popularly known as 30×30, embedded in Target 3 of the GBF, and discussed here.

Target 3: The Flagship Target

“ Ensure and enable that by 2030 at least 30% of terrestrial, inland water, and of coastal and marine areas especially areas of particular importance for biodiversity and ecosystem functions and services, are effectively conserved and managed through ecologically representative, well-connected and equitably governed systems of protected areas and other effective area-based conservation measures, recognising indigenous and traditional territories, where applicable,….”

The GBF’s flagship target is the clarion call to effectively protect “at least 30%” of land, inland waters, and coastal and marine areas by 2030, through the designation of protected areas (PAs) and use of other effective area-based conservation measures (OECMs). A Protected Area has a broad legal definition under the CBD as a clearly-defined geographical area designated or regulated and managed to achieve specific conservation objectives. In practice, there has been substantial variegation in the definition, scope and methodologies used to designate and manage PAs. PAs have also been increasingly used to address a broad array of conservation, social and economic goals. However, political commitments for increased coverage and effective management of PAs has been considerably lacking. The question that can now be asked is: Will this new impetus from international diplomacy – the GBF and the 30 x 30 Target – drive a change that can tap into the full potential of PAs?

Prior to the 15th Conference of the Parties in Montreal, the 30×30 target was already championed by the High Ambition Coalition of Nature and People, consisting of over a 100 countries. Internationally, PAs and OECMs are well-regarded as cornerstone policy instruments to directly halt and reverse ongoing biodiversity loss, with co-benefits for achieving other Sustainable Development Goals. 

In fact, scientific literature regards the 30%-aspiration to be the “lower limit for effective biodiversity conservation.” A key IUCN-UNEP report explains how 30% is the minimum target for preserving fundamental global biodiversity values – from preventing species’ extinction (halting/reversing decline of endangered or threatened species), protecting biodiversity and ecosystem-services rich areas, preserving crucial spawning areas and migration sites, and preventing fragmentation and habitat degradation in ecologically-intact areas that support large-scale ecological processes. If areas of high carbon density and climate refugia are to be offered protection, the coverage of PAs and OECMs would have to be increased to 50% of Earth’s land and sea. 

As per a detailed analysis of Target 3 by Equilibrium Research, the numerical aspiration of 30% could be subject to varying legal interpretations. Some countries may prefer to interpret 30% as an all-inclusive target, while conservation groups would prefer to aim for a 30% coverage for each of the three elements – land, inland waters, and marine/coastal areas – separately. Equilibrium Research’s analysis also sheds light on the significance of the phrase – “Ensure and enable” – under Target 3. This language reflects the dire need to establish relevant national Protected Areas-related legislation in many countries, and as Equilibrium Research’s briefing points out – the need for updating policy, as well the much-needed funding gap – in order to make effective biodiversity conservation a reality.

Quality Over Quantity for Target 3 Deliverance 

To put the 30×30 target in perspective, currently 17% of land and 8% of marine areas are under protection. Given prior concerns over the “quality” of such protected areas under Aichi Target 11, the 2022 GBF calls for the target to include “ecologically representative, well-connected and equitably governed systems” PAs and OECMs. International collaboration can be a key aspect of ensuring quality – to bring under protection only those areas rich in biodiversity (not selected “for their size but for their ecological value”) and without conflicts with Indigenous Peoples and local communities. 

In fact, a significant aspect of the GBF is the call for conservation efforts to be undertaken in a manner that respects the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities (IPLCs), “including over their traditional territories” (Target 3). Even though the latter is not recognised as a separate protection category under Target 3, the text of the GBF is commended by the International Indigenous Forum on Biodiversity for upholding the rights of IPLCs.

What of the rest of the 70% of Earth?

One scientific study affirms that simply achieving the quantitative goal set out in Target 3 would not be sufficient for maintaining ecosystems of high ecological integrity (Target 1), nor sufficient for the recovery and conservation of threatened species and genetic diversity (Target 4), nor for overall maintenance and enhancement of biodiversity-related ecosystem services (Goal B and several Targets). This is especially so if the rest of the 70% of land and sea is open to human exploitation without limits defined by biodiversity-conservation values. This is why the highly-regarded IUCN-UNEP report recommends that beyond the 30% target, best sustainability targets should be applied to protecting the remaining 70% of the Earth, in a “Whole Earth Approach.”

Guidance and standards have been developed by the IUCN with respect to what constitutes Protected Area, how to identify key Biodiversity Areas and four different governance types that ought to be used, including governance by Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities, based on human-rights based approaches. 

As always, national efforts are required to make sure these areas are well governed and effectively managed. As pointed out by the report by Equilibrium Research, action is needed on developing more comprehensive guidance on the selection criterion for OECMs with specific links to biodiversity, to ensure governments do not declare OECMs in a capricious manner. 

Cost-Benefit Analysis of the 30×30 Target

As with several environmental management and policy decisions, the 30×30 target has been subject to a cost-benefit analysis. A widely-cited analysis, involving more than 100 scientists/economists, estimates that the total economic output of sectors directly impacted (agriculture, fisheries, forestry and tourism) increases by a range of US$64-454 billion per year  (depending on the implementation approach) by 2050, in a scenario where PAs are expanded (versus non-expansion). This analysis includes the notion of PAs as an economic sector in its own right, with high-revenue generating potential through tourism.

Add to the above estimates of the large risks avoided through staving off catastrophic natural disasters, plus the non-monetary value of ecosystem services preserved, and this would dwarf the estimated investment costs of $103-178 billion per year required for the expansion of PAs under Target 3. Just a partial assessment, focussed on forests and mangroves alone, estimates an “avoided-loss” value of $170-534 billion per year from avoiding flooding, climate change, soil loss and coastal storm surge related damages. 

As PAs are central to reducing land-use change, and the latter has the largest potential impact on zoonotic disease emergence, the cost-avoidance of pandemics such as Covid19 should be at once imaginable and unimaginable to all of us inhabiting this planet today. 

Target 19

A 2020 UN Summit had called attention to a funding shortfall of $700 billion as one of the key roadblocks to successfully meeting the Aichi targets. 

The expansion of PAs to meet Target 3 requires the bulk of the investments to be made in low- and middle-income countries. This makes the availability of biodiversity-related financing for developing countries a prerequisite for success. It’s no surprise then that the issue of resource mobilisation was a major sticking point in the COP15 negotiations. 

What gives hope is the commitment  in the final outcome to mobilise at least 200 billion United States dollars per year” by 2030 from varied sources (public and private) and the agreement to set up a “global biodiversity fund” to finance the implementation. This includes a commitment to scale-up total biodiversity-related international financial resources from developed countries to developing countries, especially least-developed countries and small island developing States, to at least US$ 20 billion per year by 2025, and to at least US$ 30 billion per year by 2030.”

A major setback in the GBF, from the point of view of developing countries, was the non-inclusion of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) in the treaty texts. While CBDR’s status as a globally accepted legal norm remains contentious, it is a founding principle of the Rio Declaration (Article 7) and considered the underlying basis for the financing provisions under CBD. As well put by international scholars of environmental law (Professors Percival, Robert, Yang, Tseming et al), the CBDR principle, along with other principles such as sustainable development and intergenerational equity “gained widespread acceptance as fundamental principles of sound planetary stewardship.”

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Other Significant Targets:

• Target 2 aims at effective restoration of at least 30% of the already degraded terrestrial, inland waters, and coastal/marine ecosystems.
• Target 6 aims to eliminate, minimise, reduce and or mitigate the impacts of invasive alien species on biodiversity, including reducing the rates of introduction and establishment by at least 50%, by 2030. 
• Target 18 calls for a progressive phase out of subsidies that are harmful to biodiversity “by at least US$500 billion United States dollars per year by 2030” freeing up fiscal resources that can be used to “scale up positive incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.”
• Target 16 aims at encouraging sustainable patterns of consumption, significantly reducing overconsumption, including through halving food waste and reducing waste generation. 
• Target 15 is a significant commitment to ensure that large businesses, transnational companies and financial institutions assess and disclose their risks, dependencies and impacts on biodiversity, including in their supply and value chains. This target can be operationalised through a worldwide adoption of the recently launched Task-Force on Nature-related Financial Risk Disclosures – a global risk management and disclosure framework to integrate nature into decision-making. 

Conclusion 

The success of the Montreal Protocol – rightly acclaimed as a model for successful environmental treaties – has been attributed to several factors including the strength of commitment of parties, political will, global partnership and partnership between State and Non-State Actors. These factors are essential ingredients for the successful implementation of the GBF, especially since robust standards are required for implementing the 30×30 target, which necessitates a “two-way flow of information from local to global and vice-versa”  and maintenance of synergies with other conventions. 

The aim of the GBF was not to achieve a lowest-common denominator outcome but to be a step above international commitments/actions taken in the past. Aspects that set the GBF apart from its predecessors are the agreed-upon mechanisms for its planning, monitoring, reporting and review and the scaled-up financial commitments. A question that looms large is – will developed countries fulfil their financial commitments or will it end up a broken promise similar to the $100 billion a year for climate finance?

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The post Will the 2030s Be the Decade for Global Biodiversity Conservation? appeared first on Earth.Org.

India is forecast to be the world’s second-largest economy by 2050 – will its ambitions for “green growth” be the key driver that decouples economic growth from environmental degradation? Could green growth enhance India’s contribution towards keeping global temperature rise well below 2C, while also significantly addressing its unemployment problems? Without significant efforts by the third-largest emitter of greenhouse gas emissions and one of the fastest-growing developing economies, the Paris Agreement targets would be unattainable and so would many of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This piece unveils the cornerstone provisions of India’s recent Green Budget and reflects on the potential that lies in India’s green-growth strategies and green energy transition.

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Green Energy Transition: India’s Green Budget

India’s 2023-2024 budget is ground-breaking for its allocation of a whopping US$4.3 billion towards the country’s transition to green energy and meeting its “net zero by 2070” target. If intentions translate into action, this should put India firmly on the global map “as a leader in the global green energy market,” as envisioned by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. 

Industrial investments in clean energy sources and enhancing energy efficiency are hailed as two of the most viable options for any country’s decarbonisation efforts, at any level of development. 

Since India has historically had a fossil-fuel-based energy infrastructure, investments in renewable energy in recent years have the greatest potential to make a real difference to its climate footprint. India’s renewable energy capacity has witnessed an unprecedented growth of 396% in the past 8.5 years, amounting to a share of 42.5 % of the country’s total installed energy capacity at the time of the announcement of the 2023-24 budget. This has enabled the South Asian nation to meet its target of “175 GW of renewable energy by 2022” as submitted in its first National Determined Contribution under the Paris Agreement.

The 2023-24 budgetary allocations for national green energy schemes and projects (combined for solar, wind, hydrogen, bio-fuel, and other renewable energy sources) is around US$197 billion (or 9,874 crore rupees) – nearly 45% more than what the government expected to spend in 2022-23. This may put India well on track for increasing its non-fossil fuel capacity to 500 GW by 2030 – one of the five nectar elements (Panchamrit) of India’s climate action, as delivered by Modi at COP26 in 2021. 

Green Hydrogen

A key aspect of India’s green energy transition strategy is the National Green Hydrogen Mission, which aspires to make India a Global Hub for the production, use, and export of green hydrogen. India aims to produce 5 million metric tonnes of green hydrogen annually by the year 2030, and the government has allocated US$2.4 billion to achieve this target. The bulk of this – about 89% – would be spent on the domestic production of green hydrogen and related manufacturing of electrolysers, where renewable energy is used to drive water electrolysis – a hydrogen production pathway that emits zero greenhouse-gas emissions. 

Green hydrogen, which can produce high-temperature heat to power massive industrial processes, has huge potential to decarbonise heavy industry such as steel and cement – which together account for 50% of all industrial sector emissions and are “hard-to-abate” sectors, along with the fertiliser industry. Scientific studies also demonstrate how green hydrogen has the potential to be a game-changer as a chemical feedstock, as a clean transportation fuel for long-range heavy-duty vehicles, and as a technology for long-term energy storage, across seasons. 

However, green hydrogen is a technology that is yet to be commercially viable primarily due to its high production costs. These are attributed to inherent inefficiencies related to its production and conversion to and from electricity. The US Department of Energy’s first Energy Earthshot – the Hydrogen Shot – aims to reduce the cost of green hydrogen from $5 per kilogram to $1 per one kilogram by 2031. Large industry groups in India, such as the Adani Group and Reliance Industries, have made strong commitments to invest in green hydrogen and reduce its cost to a “dollar per kilo.”

Due to its distinct advantage in low-cost renewable energy production, India has vast potential to become one of the most competitive global producers of green hydrogen.

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Only 2% of India’s $2.4 billion budget for green hydrogen is allocated to research and development, even though successful deployment at scale strongly hinges upon hydrogen research, development, enhanced investments in the hydrogen value chain, and technology commercialisation. There remains tremendous opportunity for knowledge sharing across the globe.

As per a report by the Institute for Energy Economics & Financial Analysis, the “best commercial use case” for green hydrogen would be for producing green ammonia fertilisers, which can ease pressure on India’s US$14.2 billion fertiliser subsidy burden and offer a cleaner substitute for expensive gas imports. 

Other Key Aspects of India’s Green Budget

• In an effort to spur the manufacturing of electric vehicles, India has eliminated the import duties on the equipment to manufacture lithium-ion batteries. The upfront costs of electric vehicles have also been reduced through a reduction in customs duties for imported batteries from 21% to 13%. Budgetary outlays for the ‘Faster Adoption and Manufacturing of Electric Vehicles’ have also been significantly increased.
• For when the “sun doesn’t shine and the wind doesn’t blow,” significant investments have been promised in battery energy storage systems with 4,000 MWh capacity to be supported with viability gap funding.
• For promoting circular economy, the Budgets envisages building 500 new “waste-to-wealth plants” under the GOBARdhan Scheme.
• An amendment to the National Energy Conservation Act of 2001 is expected to present a great opportunity for enhancing energy efficiency in buildings and industry sectors. 
• A Green Credit Programme will be notified under India’s Environment (Protection) Act “to incentivize and mobilize additional resources for environmentally sustainable and responsive actions.”
• Support will be provided to 10 million farmers (one crore) to transition to “natural farming” – which involves a form of regenerative agriculture where crops are grown without fertilisers, pesticides/herbicides, tillage, or weeding. 
• A vehicle-scrapping policy for central and state government vehicles more than 15 years old, in order to reduce the government’s carbon footprint and encourage the use of clean-energy vehicles. 
• The Mangrove Initiative for Shoreline Habitats and Tangible Incomes (MISHTI) facilitates mangrove plantations along India’s coastline and on salt-pan lands. 

India’s Paris Agreement Commitments to Facilitate the Green Energy Transition

India’s commitments under its updated First Nationally Determined Contribution appear ambitious on paper. For instance, the country has pledged to reduce the carbon intensity of its GDP by 45% by 2050, from 2005 levels. However, India already achieved a 34%-reduction in its national emission intensity in 2022. At a rate of increase of 3% in GHG-emissions per annum, and a GDP (PPP) growth rate of 8% (as predicted by the International Monetary Fund), India is projected to reach its 45% reduction commitment before 2025. This assessment is corroborated by Climate Action Tracker (CAT), according to whose analysis India’s updated targets are easily met by its existing level of climate action. 

Per CAT, India’s Long-Term Strategy for Low-Carbon Development (LTS) – submitted at COP27 – provides extremely limited information and no clear and demonstrable emissions pathway on how India will reach its “net-zero by 2070” target. 

While India’s LTS emphasises the principles of equity, climate justice, and fair-share,  its current policies and actions are still rated by global agencies as “insufficient” compared to its fair share contribution. Unfortunately, the long-term development of coal also seems to be a part of India’s strategy – an additional  26 GW of coal capacity is expected to be installed by 2026-27. Moreover, subsidies for fossil fuels are still nine times higher than that for renewable energy. 

Yet, India’s updated NDC must be seen as a positive development in the post-pandemic era and a progressive step in the right direction. Other key quantitative targets in the updated NDC are – (1) Achieve about 50% cumulative electric power installed capacity from non-fossil fuel-based energy resources by 2030 and (2) Create an additional carbon sink of 2.5 to 3 billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent through additional forest and tree cover by 2030. 

Most significantly, India’s climate ambitions are cast under the powerful paradigm of ‘Lifestyle for Environment’ – a call for a global movement that envisages “healthy and sustainable way of living based on traditions and values of conservation and moderation.”  Central to this is the idea that long-term sustainability can only be achieved through tackling the root cause – the need for dramatic changes in cultural mindsets, towards more environmentally-conscious lifestyles, beginning at individual levels. 

Changes in individual and community preferences must become a mass phenomenon to constitute a “large-scale transformation” of global demands, in order to drive changes in global supply dynamics, and ultimately spur more sustainable patterns of production and consumption. This suggests a ramp-up of demand-side solutions to climate change mitigation that also inspire “long-term shifts in industrial and government policies.” It is also, in the end, a call to deviate from the “mainstream fantasy” of neoclassical economics and its simplistic assumptions, where sustainability is inconsistent with a GDP-focussed definition of economic progress, and where other factors of well-being are more important. 

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Can “Green Growth” Deliver Sustainable Development in India?

An interesting 2013 empirical study demonstrates that by pursuing massive clean energy investments, India has the potential to not only achieve significant reductions in its levels of CO2 emissions but to also attain considerable gains in employment. This puts the budgetary outlays in India’s seminal 2023-24 Green Budget on the right track.

A 2021 report by the World Economic Forum envisions a “Green New Deal” for India that has the potential to create 50 million net new jobs and close to US$15 trillion in economic opportunity by 2070, with $1 trillion of this opportunity coming to pass by 2030. 

If implemented well, the 2023-2024 Green Budget could be the most significant step for India toward making the Green New Deal a reality. All stakeholders – government, private sector, civil society, and individuals must come together. 

Last but not the least, India also needs to attract foreign (global capital) to meet its high ambitions for green energy transition targets. A question that figures prominently in the controversial debates on green growth (and applies to India as well) is whether green growth would be adequate to mitigate critical environmental pressures, to the extent necessary.

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